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1.  Motivation 
In the last few years, the economic literature has devoted substantial efforts to explain the 
phenomenon of contagion between countries. The possibility of separating pure 
contagion from fundamental-related changes in financial variables is key in the design of 
the international financial architecture. In fact, one of the most important changes of the 
international financial architecture in recent years is the clear distinction made between 
countries suffering contagion -or creating it due to their systemic importance- and those 
suffering crises because of their own fundamentals. The first group of countries appears 
to be in a better position to receive larger amounts of funds from the IMF than the second 
group3. 
The phenomenon of contagion is also of particular interest for investors since they can 
profit from events where there is no perfect arbitrage or where herd behaviour exists. In 
particular, if an investor were to know beforehand that a country’s financial variables 
suffer contagion from another country’s financial variables when a shock occurs, he or 
she could profit from this information. 
For both interests (the international community’s and investors’), the concept of 
contagion needs to be defined accurately since decisions need to be taken on the basis of 
its existence or absence. This is particularly problematic  if we consider that there is no 
consensus in the literature on the definition of contagion and the extent of the 
phenomenon. This lack of consensus is related to the difficulty in measuring such a high 
frequency event because of potential problems of simultaneity, omitted variables, 
conditional and unconditional heteroskedasticity, serial correlation, non linearity and 
non-normality4. Therefore, distinguishing contagion events from other market 
movements is an empirical question, which still needs to be answered. 
                                                    
3 More specifically, the IMF Supplementary Reserve Facility (SRF) is designed for countries which “may 
create a risk of contagion that could pose a potential threat to the international monetary system”, while the 
Contingent Credit Line (CCL) was designed for those countries who co uld suffer from contagion 
(IMF, 1997). 
4 For a review of these potential problems see Rigobon (2001). 
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In this paper, we build upon existing definitions of contagion by narrowing down the 
concept in several ways. Our objective is to improve the measurability and comparability 
of events of potential contagion. This seems crucial in view of the role that contagion 
plays in the provision of international financial assistance , and is certainly also useful for 
investors. 
This is a demanding endeavour, which cannot be a accomplished in a single project. We 
now concentrate on one market, emerging countries' sovereign bonds, and in one type of 
shock, a downgrade in a country's sovereign rating different than the one that may 
potentially suffer from contagion. 
The reasons for these two choices are the following. First, emerging countries are those 
more dependent on international financial assistance and their sovereign bonds are 
particularly relevant financial assets, being closely associated with country risk. In 
addition, emerging countries’ sovereign bonds constitute an asset class in which investors 
are interested. Second, sovereign ratings are an aggregate measure of a country's 
fundamentals. Downgrades in sovereign ratings should be a good proxy for a shock since 
they generally reflect a sharp deterioration in fundamentals.  However, there could be 
problems with this proxy if the timing of the downgrade does not coincide with the 
shock. In addition, not all shocks are reflected by a downgrade. As far as investors ’ are 
concerned, though a rating downgrade is  an important piece of information, which is 
incorporated in their investment decisions. This implies that the proxy we have chosen 
for a shock is probably more appropriate for an analysis of contagion from an investor’s 
point of view than for the international community, more interested in the propagation of 
crisis events . 
Another important objective of this study is to concentrate, to the extent possible, on pure 
contagion and not on relations between emerging countries’ sovereign bonds which can 
be explained by other factors, such as general market movements. This idea can be 
associated with the literature of herd behaviour [Calvo (1999), Calvo and 
Mendoza (1999), Kodres and Pritsker (1999) and Kumar and Presaud (2001)]. 
 9 
The most appropriate methodology to answer this question is, in our view, the 
application of a multifactor asset pricing model for sovereign bonds’ returns, as can be 
found in the work of Bekaert et al. (2003) and Díez de los Rí os (2003). This framework 
has three main advantages with respect to other tests of contagion. Firstly, the factor 
structure implicitly defines common shocks and the links between financial and real 
activity. Secondly, it takes into account the statistical fact that correlations increase 
during periods of financial turmoil. Thirdly, any pricing model is ultimately based on 
utility maximizing agents, which implies that rational decisions should be incorporated in 
the model and whatever is left (potentially contagion) could be considered irrational as 
long as  the model appropriately describes asset price movements. 
As a second step, we measure  contagion from a dynamic point of view. We do so by 
testing whether the pricing errors of a country's bond excess returns from our asset 
pricing model are dynamically causing another country's pricing errors . This is an 
innovation to the existing literature. Another innovation is the distinction between 
contagion and portfolio shifts. 
In sum, this paper has two objectives : narrowing down the definition of contagion to 
make it more comparable among different events, and testing for contagion in the 
sovereign bond markets of emerging countries. The paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 reviews the literature on the definitions of contagion and the empirical results 
for emerging markets' sovereign bonds. Section 3 presents our working definition of 
contagion and our estimation methodology. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 
presents the results and Section 6 the conclusions and future extensions of the work. 
2. Review of the literature 
In the literature, there is a considerable amount of debate concerning the precise 
definition of contagion, and how to measure it [Pericoli and Sbracia (2001), Forbes and 
Rigobon (2001), Rigobon (2001) and Bayoumi et al. (2003)]. The existence of contagion 
conveys the idea that economic models based on fundamentals or channels of 
international transmission (i.e., trade or financial links) exclude important issues, such as 
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changes in risk appetite [Kumar and Peraud (2001)], asymmetric information or, more 
generally, the way international investors' operate [Goldfjan and Valdes (1997) and 
Calvo (1999)] or the indeterminacy of equilibrium [Masson (1998)]. For some authors, 
these are “rationally justifiable” reasons for contagion, for others they are not. In this 
study, we do not attempt to identify the channels of contagion or its rationality or 
irrationality. We take this as given and fo cus on delimiting existing definitions of 
contagion to make the phenomenon more comparable across events. However, the fact 
that we limit our definition to a very narrow set of events approaches our definition to 
that of  “pure contagion” . 
The first, and pe rhaps most important attempt, to make the concept of contagion more 
operational is that of Forbes and Rigobon (2001) 5. The authors define contagion as “a 
significant increase in cross-market asset linkages after a shock to an individual country 
or group of countries” 6. We note that the focus is on developments after a shock, to 
distinguish it from normal times. However, the authors do not specify clearly what kind 
of shock may lead to contagion. In addition a general expression -cross-country asset 
linkages - is used to describe the co-movement between different countries' financial 
assets when contagion occurs. In the authors' mind such linkages can be measured by 
“anything from the correlation in assets returns, to the probability of an speculative 
attack, to the transmission of shocks or volatility”. The main thing is that the 
interlinkages increase after a shock, compared with tranquil periods. 
Such interlinkages have generally been identified with bi-variate correlations [King and 
Wadwani (1990), Baig and Goldfajn (1998) and Bayoumi et al. (2003)]. However, it is 
widely acknowledged that a high correlation could be due to common factors other than 
contagion. 
Another approach is the estimation of the variance-covariance transmission mechanism 
across countries, using ARCH or GARCH models. Edwards (1998) uses a univariate 
GARCH model for bond markets after the 1995 Mexican crisis, and finds that the 
                                                    
5 Another recent attempt can be found on Bayoumi et al. (2003), but they focus on correlations.  
6 They call it shift -contagion, to differentiate from other more general definitions of contagion.  
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increase in volatility in Mexico's bond market had a significant impact on Argentina´s 
volatility, but not on Chile  ’s  . However these studies focus on volatility spillovers 
between asset returns so their co-movement is not really measured. 
Other authors have concentrated on changes in long -run relationships, which however do 
not fit very well with Forbes and Rigobon's definition of immediate increases in linkages 
after a shock. Finally, another strand of the literature has opted for identifying simple 
models of propagation of shocks after exogenous events [Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (1999)]. While potentially very informative, this approach does not offer a very 
precise measure of contagion. One of the main objectives of our paper is finding a more 
precise definition of  “interlinkages” which distinguishes contagion from other events. 
In order to narrow down the definition of contagion to a more operational one, it seems 
important to identify which are the main factors determining the returns of emerging 
countries' sovereign bonds. In fact, only what cannot be explained by such factors should 
be called contagion. Interest rate, exchange rate and credit (or sovereign) risks are the 
most widely accepted determinants of sovereign bond excess returns [Kamin and Von 
Kleist (1999)]. The interest rate risk hinges on the interest rate structure (and maturity) of 
sovereign bonds as compared to other bond portfolios. Exchange rate risk is particularly 
relevant for local currency-denominated sovereign bonds. Credit risk depends on the 
country's economic fundamentals [Min (1998)]. The ability to clean sovereign bonds 
from these factors' influence before testing for contagion is another important objective 
of our paper. 
The measure of credit risk is particularly problematic, because it is related to a large 
number of variables reflecting a country's fundamentals. Several authors have used credit 
ratings, together with macroeconomic variables, as a proxy of credit risk [Cantor and 
Packer (1996), and Eichengreen and Moody, (1998)]. Others have used credit ratings as 
single variable determining credit risk [Erb, Harvey and Viskanta (2000), and Kamin and 
Von Kleist (1999)]. We will follow the latter line for reasons explained in Section 4. 
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3. Definition of contagion and methodology 
Taking Forbes and Rigobon's working definition of contagion as a benchmark, ours will 
necessarily have to refer to (i) a situation after a shock, and (ii) cross-country 
interlinkages. From a broad concept, such as that of “interlinkages”, we exclude those 
movements related to the main determinants of sovereign bond returns and obtain the 
pricing errors. We, then, test fo r a dynamic causal relation between pricing errors, after a 
shock occurs. In this more restrictive framework, contagion can be defined as the causal 
dynamic co-movement between the pricing errors of sovereign bonds, after a shock 
occurs. In the case of contagion, the co-movement will necessarily be positive while it 
will be negative in the event of a portfolio shift. 
One of the advantages of this narrower definition is that we can limit ourselves to pure 
contagion (pure portfolio shift), and not market driven interlinkages . Another one is that 
we can say something on the direction of the transmission of pricing errors and, thereby, 
which countries are sources of contagion (or a portfolio shift) and which are recipients. 
We now describe the methodology used in more detail. 
3.1 An asset pricing model of sovereign bond excess returns  
As previously mentioned, we choose to apply a multifactor asset pricing model to explain 
the developments in emerging countries’ sovereign bond returns. This framework has 
three main advantages with respect to other tests of contagion. Firstly, the factor structure 
implicitly defines common shocks and the links between financial and real activity, or as 
Bekaert et al. (2003) put it, the “mechanism that links the fundamentals to asset  returns”. 
Secondly, it takes into account the statistical fact that correlations increase during periods 
of financial turmoil [Corseti et al. (2002), Forbes and Rigobon (2002), and King, Sentana 
and Wadhwani (1994)]. Thirdly, any pricing model is ultimately related to a model with 
utility maximizing agents. This means that a systematic behaviour of pricing errors, such 
as a causal dynamic co-movement between two pricing errors, will be close to “pure 
contagion” (or “irrational”, as a strand of the literature would call it). 
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It should be acknowledged that the explanatory power of the asset pricing model may be 
reduced by the lack of integration of asset markets, scarce liquidity and/or infrequent 
trading. Notwithstanding these potential problems, the asset pricing model has been 
proven to be a useful tool to describe asset price movements in most markets, including 
emerging countries’ sovereign bonds [Bekaert et al. (2003) and Díez de los Ríos (2003)] . 
As for the precise methodology , a three factor asset pricing model is taken to extract 
general market movements from the information of emerging countries' sovereign bonds. 
The three factors reflect movements in world assets, those of the same asset class and 
those of the currencies of investing countries . Credit risk will be tackled later because of 
the difficulties of incorporating it in the asset pricing model. 
We use the dynamic version of the Arbitrage Pricing Theory proposed by King, Sentana 
and Wadhwani (1994) and Sentana (2002). We make use of the estimat ion method 
proposed by Sentana (2002) who applied this methodology to measure the impact of the 
European Exchange Mechanism (ERM) on the cost of capital for European firms. In the 
method is based on the generalized moments method (GMM) developed by 
Hansen (1982). 
The analysis is based in a world with a large number of countries   j = 1,..., N, and 
assumes that for each country there is one long-term bond portfolio, whose random gross 
holding return over period t, and denominated in US$, is Rjt. Let 
(
Rc$t be the gross return 
on a safe asset during period t, also denominated in US$. The excess return of the bond 
portfolio for each country in terms of US$ is, thus, given by: 
tcjtjt RRr $loglog  -= 
component (as of t – 1), rajt can be expressed as: 
jtjtjtr hm +=  
Provided that excess returns consist of a risk premia (µ) and an unanticipated  Ș)
 14 
If the relevant model for investors were an international CAPM and the global market 
bond portfolio were mean-variance-efficient, the expected return on any security or 
portfolio would be fully explained by its loading on the global market bond portfolio 
excess return. But, as pointed earlier, such traditional risk factor models perform poorly 
when applied to emerging financial markets, given that there are other substantial risks 
not captured in the CAPM. It seems, therefore, reasonable to include additional factors, 
other than the global market bond portfolio, to explain the returns of a country's 
sovereign bonds, summarized in the EMBI index, by means of an APT model. We 
propose a three factor model to capture the systematic risk in emerging bond returns: 
{
RiskticIdiosyncra
jt
RiskSystematic
rtrjwtwjetejjt fff ubbbh +++= 444 3444 21
  (1) 
where the first factor –fet– is a currency risk component stemining from the deviations 
from Purchasing Power Parity in the home countries of investors. This risk is not related 
to the host country´s local currency since the emerging countries’ sovereign bonds 
chosen are all denominated in US dollar. However, the exchange rate risk still exists 
depending on the country of origin of investors, since not all currency movements can be 
diversified away7. 
Secondly we include a world factor –fwt– in order to capture the international 
comovements in bond returns, and an asset-class factor -frt– in order to capture 
comovements within the asset class of emerging markets bonds. 
Furthermore we will assume that: 
(i) Common and specific factors are unpredictable on the basis of past information, to 
                                                    
7 When PPP does not hold, there is a currency risk premia that is related to the conditional covariance of 
the asset excess return with the excess return of a diversified currency deposit portfolio. See Adler and 
Dumas (1983) for further details.  
guarantee that the Ș's are innovations. 
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(ii) The common factors are orthogonal to each other and for the idiosyncratic terms, 
which by definition are orthogonal to ( )¢= rtwtett ffff ,, , we assume that they are 
orthogonal to one another for a given country j. 
Under a no arbitrage assumption, it can be proven that there is a stochastic discount 
factor that prices the available assets by discounting the uncertain payoffs across 
different states of the world. In particular, assuming a linear model for the discount 
factor, the risk premia will have a beta representation which implies8: 
rtrjwtwjetejjt pbpbpbm ++=   (2) 
where  pkt is the risk premium that corresponds to the factor k . Note that this benchmark 
model implies that country specific risk should not be priced, as long as risk premia 
depend on the common factors, not on the assets. 
Combining (1) and (2) we obtain: 
jt
R
rtrj
R
wtwj
R
etejjt fffr ubbb +++=   (3) 
or in matrix notation Rtjjtr fb= ,  where  ),,(),,,( rwekff ktkt
R
ktrjwjejj =+== pbbbb . 
This can be interpreted as the excess returns of three portfolios, ),,( ¢= Rrt
R
wt
R
et
R
t ffff , that 
mimic the three factors introduced, as long as pk represents the risk premium and fkt the 
unanticipated component (as of t – 1) associated to the common factor k . 
Since Rtf are not directly observable we can construct, as proposed by Sentana (2002), 
three fully diversified portfolios of currency deposits (c), a global bond portfolio (s)  and 
an emerging-local bond portfolio (g), with excess returns given by ),,( ¢= gtstctpt rrrr  that 
capture the systematic risk structure: 
R
etct fr =  
                                                    
8 See Sentana (2002) for an extended discussion of the pricing relationship. For the sake of clarity, the 
same notation is used as in Sentana’s paper. 
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R
wt
R
etesst ffr += b     (4) 
R
rt
R
wtwg
R
eteggt fffr ++= bb  
1=== grwsec bbb . Therefore we can obtain estimates of prwe Bp ,)( ,, ¢= ppp  and jb by 
employing the Generalised Met hod of Moments (GMM) 9. Robust standard errors are 
calculated using the Newey -West approach with a bandwidth of 7 lags )( 31T@ . 
3.2 Contagion Tests 
As a second step, we test whether the pricing errors of a country's sovereign bonds 
explain future pricing errors of another country's sovereign bonds . To this end, we use 
the residuals from the asset pricing equations (i.e., the pricing errors) and test whether the 
co-movements in pricing errors are causally related after a shock occurs in a cert ain 
country. Causality will be measured in the Granger sense. 
We test whether the coefficient of country i's lagged pricing error is different from zero 
in the equation of country j 's pricing error. 
ijtjtijit eugu += -1   (5) 
Note that this implementation is equivalent to the traditional Granger causality test where 
it is imposed that other lagged pricing errors different from that of country i's are zero. 
Although both tests are equivalent under the null hypothesis of no contagion, this 
implementation has the advantage that our alternative hypothesis coincides with our 
working definition of contagion, namely that there is a causal dynamic co-movement 
between the pricing errors of two countries' sovereign bonds. 
At this stage, we need to introduce a shock from which to test for contagion. The choice 
of was is meant by a shock is crucial in this setting. We use downgrades in sovereign 
                                                    
9 See Sentana (2002) for details.  
or in matrix notation Rtjjt fǺr   , and where the scaling of the common factors are set to 
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ratings with a double aim: First, downgrades in a country's own ratings proxy should 
mirror a worsening in a country's fundamentals, that is, in credit risk. This is how 
sovereign ratings are generally used in the empirical literature on sovereign bonds. In our 
empirical strategy, including changes in a country's own rating allows us to extract any 
information related to credit risk that may have remained in the pricing errors from the 
asset pricing model. Second, changes in another country's ratings stand for the worsening 
of fundamentals in another country, which is our proxy for a shock. Note that the rating 
downgrade does not necessarily have to be that of the country against which we test for 
causality but it could also be a third country. This allows us to consider potential 
contagion from third countries, transmitted through another one. 
While not all shocks are accompanied by rating downgrades and not all downgrades 
occurred under very difficult circumstances, this is, in our view, the best available proxy 
of a shock with a high enough frequency. Using ratings has several advantages : First, 
their simplicity, since all the information about a country´s fundamentals is summarized 
in one single indicator. Second, rating agencies can decide to change a rating at any point 
in time, which implies that they can be incorporated in the analysis of high frequency 
data. 
There are, however, disadvantages in using rating downgrades as a proxy for a shock. 
One is the persistence of ratings, shown by the high first order positive auto-correlation, 
even higher than that of sovereign bond yields10. Another disadvantage is the fact that 
ratings may change due to factors different than those suggested by the literature [Mulder 
and Perrelli (2001), and Sy (2001)] and that there may be an overshooting of downgrades 
in crisis periods [Ferri, Liu and Stiglitz (1999)]. 
More precisely, we introduce a dummy variable, DownOwnit, which takes the value of 1 
in the 4 weeks before and after a downgrade is announced for country i; and another 
dummy variable, DownOtherit, which takes the value of 1 in the 4 weeks before and after 
                                                    
10 Monfort and Mulder (2000) attribute such autocorrelation to the fact that ratings should only respond to 
new information. This corresponds well to the professed objective of rating agencies to limit changes in 
grading. 
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a downgrade is announced in any other country j different from i11. We, thus, augment 
the regressors in equation (5) to include interaction terms of the lagged pricing error with 
these two dummies. In particular, we want to test whether coefficients on the lagged 
pricing error and the interaction term with DownOtherit are equal to zero, which would 
imply that no causal dynamic comovement exists from excess returns in country j to 
country i: 
ijtitjtijitjtijjtijit DownOtherDownOwn euxuVugu +++= --- 111  (6) 
Given that the pricing errors depend on the estimates of the asset pric ing model, these 
equations must be estimated jointly with the asset pricing equations to obtain a correct 
inference. 
4. Data 
Our sample is composed of weekly data for 11 countries, starting on January 18, 1995 
and ending on November 4, 2001. This amounts to 326 observations per country. 
We take information from sovereign bond returns for the largest number of emerging 
countries possible for which there is comparable data for a relatively long time series. 
J.P. Morgan Securities offers a number of different daily indices of emerging market 
bond returns. We choose the EMBI+, which includes dollar-denominated Brady bonds 
and other non-local currency-denominated bonds starting from January 1995. 
J.P. Morgan also produces an index of local currency-denominated bond paper (the 
Emerging Local Currency Index) but we prefer to use foreign-currency denominated 
bonds since credit risk and local exchange rate risk are many times closely intertwined. 
Furthermore, the EMBI+ offers a relatively longer series than other J.P. Morgan 
emerging country bond indices. Finally, the choice of EMBI+, with its relatively high 
                                                    
11 We also consider the period before the downgrade because of the widely accepted view that rating 
agencies tend to react late to a change in a country's fundamentals.  
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minimum liquidity criteria12 as compared with single sovereign bonds, allows us to 
disregard a potential liquidity risk premium.  
We take those countries with an EMBI+ index and without missing observations13 from 
January 1995 onwards.  These are eleven countries: Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, M exico, 
Morocco, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, Poland, Russia and Venezuela14. Data are weekly to 
avoid week-of-day effects. 
We calculate the weekly excess return for country j sovereign bond portfolio rjt by 
subtracting the weekly U.S. Federal Fund rate to the EMBI+ index for country j. 
Although J.P. Morgan offers readably calculated EMBI spreads, which control for 
potential distortions in US Treasuries, such as floating coupons, principal collateral and 
rolling interest rate guarantees, we prefer to calculate the excess returns, rather than use 
the EMBI+ spreads for homogeneity with other asset returns used in the two-factor asset 
pricing model described in the previous section. Table 1 present summary statistics of the 
weekly excess returns. 
The data for the three factors of our asset pricing model are the following. To measure 
world market risk, we use weekly data of the MSCI World Index and, as before, subtract 
the weekly U.S. Federal Fund rate to obtain excess returns. To measure asset class 
market risk, we take weekly excess returns of the full EMBI+ Index15 and subtract the 
weekly U.S. Federal Fund rate. Finally, for the exchange rate risk, we calculate an 
aggregate equally weighted, portfolio using weekly data on currency deposits excess 
returns for Australia, Canada, Japan, and ten European countries (Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and  UK)16. Note that 
the limited availability of the short interest rates needed to build the currency deposits 
excess returns also limits the sample. 
                                                    
12 Instruments in the EMBI+ must have a minimum $500 million of face value and must be available and 
liquid. 
13 The GMM procedure requires that there are no missing observations.  
14 There was daily data available for the Philippines from January 1995 onwards but, unfortunately, there 
was a period close to the Asian crisis where data was missing.  
15 JP Morgan calculates the EMBI+ Index as an aggregation of single indices for 24 countries.  
16 These are the main investors´ in emerging countries´ sovereign bonds and this subject to exchange rate 
risk against the US dollar. The US is obviously excluded.  
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Finally, we use the sovereign ratings history for each country from January 1995 
onwards from Moody's foreign currency sovereign ratings (2002), as a proxy for shocks 
in fundamentals in the own country and elsewhere. 
5. Results  
We, first, estimate the three -factor asset pricing model, which explain sovereign bond 
returns. The results show which is the degree of comovement implied by the factorial 
structure and the asset pricing model. Table 2 presents the estimates of the diversified 
portfolios. It shows that the excess returns of the MSCI portfolio and those of the 
currency portfolio are significantly and positively correlated ßes >0, in the same way as 
those of the MSCI portfolio and the EMBI+ ßwr >0. On the other hand, the excess returns 
of the EMBI+ portfolio and those of the currency portfolio are negatively correlated 
ßer< 0. 
Moreover, the world and emerging market risks have a positive reward, being pw and pr 
positive (although both are estimated imprecisely) while pc is found to be negative. The 
latter can be explained by the continuous appreciation of the US with respect to the euro 
in our estimation period17. 
The results from estimating the factor loadings of the asset pricing model are presented in 
Table 3. The coefficient of the bond excess returns on the exchange rate factor (ßej) is 
negative for every country, although it is only significant at a 5% level for Nigeria. This 
implies that in a few cases, sovereign bond returns suffer when there is a generalized 
appreciation of other currencies against the dollar. Sensitivities of the bond returns to 
common world and asset class factors ( wj and ßrj,, respectively) are both positive. ß
Therefore, an increase in world and emerging excess returns lead to increases in 
individual countries’ returns. Finally, we note that the estimated pricing error aj, where 
                                                    
17 A robustness exercise excluding the asset class market risk was conducted. In particular, taking out the 
asset-class market risk probably implies a misspecification of the model and, thus, larger pricing errors. 
The results of the Granger causality are much weaker than for the three -factor model. The corresponding 
tables are available upon request to the authors.  
Dj = E(ȣjt), is not significantly different from zero. This shows that the three factors of 
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our asset pricing model are able to explain excess returns of emerging countries 
sovereign bonds relatively well. 
We, then, extract the pricing errors from the three factor model for each of the eleven 
countries and conduct bilateral Granger causality tests. We first disregard shocks for the 
purpose of comparison. The estimated equation on which we run the Granger causality 
test is: 
ijtjtijit eugu += -1  
Table 4 presents the estimates of this equation and shows that several causal 
comovements are found, which however should not be interpreted as contagion since 
they refer to the whole sample and not necessarily to the developments after a shock. For 
example, Argentina's pricing errors granger cause those of Ecuador and Russia for the 
whole sample period. The negative sign of their dynamic relation indicates that there has 
been a portfolio shift from Argentina to Ecuador and Russia -and not contagion- in the 
way we have defined it. 
We, now, introduce shocks in the equation, by including sovereign ratings as an 
additional regressor. 
ijtitjtijitjtijjtijit DownOtherDownOwn euxuVugu +++= --- 111  
Several results change: The previous negative Granger causality (the portfolio shift) 
found from Argentina to Ecuador disappears but that of Argentina to Russia remains 
(Table 5). Evidence of portfolio shift after a country's downgrade is also found , at least at 
a 5% confidence level, from Brazil to Venezuela, from Mexico to Russia and Venezuela, 
from Morocco to Brazil, from Panama to Russia, from Peru to Venezuela, from Poland to 
Russia and from Venezuela to Poland. We conduct a Wald test to determine if it is the 
change in the rating of the source country (or another country's rating) which explains the 
portfolio shift and find that this is the case only for a few cases  (at least at the 5% 
confidence level), namely that of from Mexico to Venezuela, from Poland to Russia and 
from Venezuela to Poland (Table 6). These can be considered the only clear cases of 
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portfolio shift stemming from a rating downgrade of the source country or a third one. 
These results are robust to reverse causality since it is not found in any of the three cases. 
As for contagion, we find a positive causal relation from Argentina to Mexico, from 
Brazil to Mexico, from Ecuador to Nigeria and Russia, from Morocco to Argentina18 and 
Venezuela, from Nigeria to Argentina and Venezuela, from Panama to Brazil, from Peru 
to Brazil, and from Poland to Argentina (Table 5). When conducting Wald tests on the 
explanatory power of the downgrade, and contagion is only confirmed from Brazil to 
Mexico, from Ecuador to Nigeria, from Morocco to Argentina and Poland to Argentina, 
at a 5% confidence level, at least (Table 6). As before, these contagion events are not 
weakened by reserve causality, except in the case of Ecuador and Nigeria at a 10% 
confidence level. In addition in the case of Morocco, the potential lack of liquidity is a 
concern. 
6. Conclusions and future extensions  
In this paper we narrow down the definition of contagion taking into account 
general market,  movements  , those of the same asset class  , investors´ currency risk 
and credit risk. When these factors are discounted, we find empirical evidence of a 
few events of causal negative (positive) dynamic co  -movement after a shock. We 
consider these contagion (portfolio shift) on the basis of our working definition. 
In particular, portfolio shifts seem to have occurred from Mexico to Venezuela, from 
Poland to Russia and from Venezuela to Poland in the period of analysis. Contagion 
events seem to have occurred from Brazil to Mexico, and from Poland to Argentina. 
It is important to note that the cases of portfolio -shift and contagion cannot be due to 
general market developments since they have been previously extracted from the pricing 
errors thanks to the methodology used. In addition, the introduct ion of the own country's 
downgrades should have contributed to eliminating credit risk in the pricing errors. This 
implies that the events of contagion found can be considered very close to pure 
contagion. 
                                                    
18 The relative lack of liquidity of the EMBI for Morocco implies that it should be taken with caution. 
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The question remains, though, whether a downgrade in another country's rating is an 
appropriate proxy for a substantial shock to a country. In addition, our working definition 
focuses on short-term causal co-movements (one week after the shock). This means that 
the cases of contagion (or portfolio shift) we find do not have to coincide with longer 
term causal relations. This makes our definition more useful for investors in search of 
arbitrage opportunities than for policy decisions by international organizations related to
the international financial architecture. Furthermore, rating downgrades are a variable that 
investors focus on more than the international community. For the latter, a longer-term 
definition of contagion and a broader definition of a shock would be warranted since the  
granting of financial assistance to a country subject to cont agion needs to be based on a 
problem which is not to disappear very quickly. However, the broadening of the definition 
should not be such as to make it impossible to compare across events in an objective way. 
Given the importance that contagion has for the international financial architecture, 
additional work in this direction is clearly a useful endeavour and will constitute the 
objective of future extensions of our paper. To do so, we need to extend the period in 
which the causal dynamic co -movements bet ween two countries’ excess returns are 
tested. We also need to apply broader definitions of a shock. Finally, the analysis could 
be extended to other emerging countries’ financial assets of relevance for contagion, 
mostly exchange rate movements and, to a lesser extent, the stock exchange . 
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 Table 1 
Summary Statistics Weekly Returns (%) 
   
Portfolio Mean Std Dev 
Currency -0,119 0,997 
MSCI -0,020 0,813 
EMBI+ 0,230 2,477 
Argentina 0,195 2,672 
Brazil 0,220 3,170 
Ecuador 0,197 4,599 
Mexico 0,219 2,102 
Morocco 0,218 2,512 
Nigeria 0,263 2,949 
Panama 0,350 2,696 
Peru 0,288 3,427 
Poland 0,251 1,803 
Russia 0,274 6,312 
Venezuela 0,302 2,935 
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Table 2 
Risk premia and factor loading for diversified portfolios  
Three Factor Model 
          
World Common Exchange Common World Common asset-class 
Portfolios Rate Risk Market Risk Market Risk 
Currency bec= 1,000     
       
MSCI bes= 0,616*** bws= 1,000   
 (0,040)     
EMBI ber= -0,235 bwr= 0,566** bgr= 1,000 
 (0,207)   (0,259)       
  pe= -0,119** pw= 0,053* pr= 0,172 
   (0,059)   (0,031)   (0,140)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GMM estimates of the following system of equations: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
where: 
 
(***), (**), (*) indicates coefficient significantly different from zero at the 
1%, 5% and 10% level respectively 
 
S.E. in parenthesis  
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Table 3 
Factor Loadings for Bond Returns: Three Factor Model 
         
Countries 
Common 
Exchange Common World Common A. Class 
Idiosyncratic 
Risk 
  Rate Risk (bej) Market Risk (bwj) Market Risk (brj) Pricing (aj) 
Argentina -0,330 0,788** 0,973*** -0,054 
 (0,265) (0,322) (0,058) (0,065) 
Brazil -0,303 0,326 1,202*** -0,040 
 (0,225) (0,292) (0,089) (0,054) 
Ecuador -0,485* 1,004** 1,340*** -0,144 
 (0,267) (0,466) (0,107) (0,179) 
Mexico -0,196 0,599*** 0,744*** 0,035 
 (0,146) (0,204) (0,057) (0,055) 
Morocco -0,229 0,241 0,877*** 0,027 
 (0,180) (0,234) (0,059) (0,063) 
Nigeria -0,456** 0,543 0,765*** 0,048 
 (0,220) (0,383) (0,101) (0,086) 
Panama -0,495* 0,951*** 0,815*** 0,100 
 (0,278) (0,274) (0,079) (0,106) 
Peru -0,267 0,950*** 1,045*** 0,026 
 (0,311) (0,316) (0,108) (0,096) 
Poland -0,259 0,789*** 0,490*** 0,094 
 (0,183) (0,191) (0,083) (0,066) 
Russia -0,055 0,366 1,597*** -0,027 
 (0,367) (0,842) (0,289) (0,401) 
Venezuela -0,180 0,693*** 0,942*** 0,082 
  (0,192)  (0,267)  (0,093)  (0,102)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GMM estimates of the following system of equations: 
 
 
 
where: 
 
(***), (**), (*) indicates coefficient significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% level respectively 
 
S.E. in parenthesis  
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Table 4 
Granger Causality Tests: Three Factor Model 
                      
Countries Argentina   Brazil   Ecuador   Mexico   Morocco   Nigeria   Panama   Peru   Poland   Russia   Venezuela 
i\j                                           
Argentina 0,096* 0,070  -0,005 -0,015 0,133 *** -0,021 -0,053 -0,045  -0,073 -0,019** -0,023 
 (0,058)  (0,065)   (0,016)  (0,085)  (0,039)   (0,035)  (0,045)  (0,031)   (0,072)  (0,008)  (0,037)  
Brazil 0,019 -0,215 * 0,020 0,032 -0,035  0,079 0,071** 0,037  0,030 0,018 0,018 
 (0,107)  (0,124)   (0,031)  (0,079)  (0,057)   (0,055)  (0,031)  (0,028)   (0,044)  (0,020)  (0,048)  
Ecuador -0,290** 0,374 * -0,108 -0,102 -0,278 *** 0,040 -0,213** -0,028  -0,155 0,027 0,045 
 (0,126)  (0,195)   (0,083)  (0,179)  (0,098)   (0,106)  (0,104)  (0,098)   (0,149)  (0,034)  (0,099)  
Mexico 0,127* -0,087  -0,001 0,029 0,042  -0,021 0,003 0,010  0,086 -0,012 -0,033 
 (0,066)  (0,094)   (0,013)  (0,083) (0,055)   (0,026)  (0,038)  (0,028)   (0,095)  (0,014)  (0,031)  
Morocco 0,045 -0,086  -0,026 -0,036 0,002  -0,008 0,018 -0,019  0,084 0,014 0,008 
 (0,066)  (0,082)   (0,018)  (0,052)  (0,065)   (0,027)  (0,053)  (0,031)   (0,067)  (0,014)  (0,034)  
Nigeria -0,111 0,274 ** -0,029 -0,053 -0,163  -0,144** -0,064 0,060  -0,033 -0,006 -0,038 
 (0,084)  (0,112)   (0,045)  (0,104)  (0,115)   (0,069)  (0,067)  (0,051)   (0,076)  (0,022)  (0,065)  
Panama 0,144 0,129 * -0,048 0,014 -0,001  -0,011 0,085 -0,083  -0,174 -0,027 -0,030 
 (0,096)  (0,073)   (0,047)  (0,164)  (0,102)   (0,039)  (0,054)  (0,076)   (0,148)  (0,020)  (0,060)  
Peru 0,122 0,204 ** -0,094** -0,192 -0,060  0,017 -0,019 -0,153  -0,144 -0,017 -0,014 
 (0,109)  (0,103)   (0,042)  (0,166)  (0,115)   (0,059)  (0,064)  (0,063)   (0,132)  (0,024)  (0,072)  
Poland 0,074 0,131 * 0,003 -0,044 -0,087  -0,021 0,018 0,036  0,084 -0,019 -0,104 
 (0,094)  (0,069)   (0,017)  (0,078)  (0,061)   (0,024)  (0,039)  (0,036)   (0,052)  (0,020)  (0,045) 
Russia -0,866*** 0,403  0,090 0,016 -0,406  -0,221 -0,200 0,006  -0,041 0,132* -0,123 
 (0,322)  (0,265)   (0,108)  (0,259)  (0,298)   (0,149)  (0,173)  (0,125)   (0,210)  (0,078)  (0,238)  
Venezuela 0,010 0,055  -0,030 -0,242*** 0,076  0,025 -0,008 -0,054  -0,090 0,006 0,133 
  (0,112)   (0,151)    (0,041)   (0,088)   (0,132)    (0,062)   (0,054)   (0,050)    (0,079)   (0,030)   (0,079)  
 
 
 
 
GMM estimates of:  
 
where: 
 
(***), (**), (*) indicates coefficient significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively  
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Table 5 
Granger Causality Tests: Three factor Model with Ratings 
Estimates 
                         
Countries Argentina Brazil Ecuador  Mexico Morocco Nigeria 
i\j gij    gij + zij + xij    gij    gij + zij + xij    gij    gij + zij + xij    gij    gij + zij + xij    gij    gij + zij + xij    gij    gij + zij + xij    
Argentina 0,072 0,204 0,061 0,191 0,004 -0,100 -0,020 0,422 0,101** 0,411*** -0,035 0,242*** 
 (0,064)  (0,197) (0,074)  (0,190)  (0,017)  (0,029)  (0,098)  (0,455)  (0,045)  (0,117)  (0,039)  (0,060)  
Brazil -0,010 -0,653* -0,272* 0,013 0,025 -0,160 0,002 0,244 -0,017 -0,234** 0,084 0,010 
 (0,120)  (0,368) (0,151)  (0,245)  (0,037)  (0,132)  (0,099)  (0,288)  (0,063)  (0,097)  (0,068)  (0,057)  
Ecuador  -0,271* -0,752 0,526** -0,848 -0,106 -0,226** -0,066 -0,282 -0,266** -0,353* 0,012 0,182* 
 (0,141)  (0,815) (0,209)  (0,699)  (0,095)  (0,096)  (0,201)  (0,508)  (0,109)  (0,208)  (0,124)  (0,105)  
Mexico 0,116 0,185*** -0,142 0,276*** 0,003 -0,033 0,013 0,182 0,058 -0,025 -0,016 -0,052 
 (0,078)  (0,067) (0,103)  (0,094)  (0,015)  (0,023)  (0,086)  (0,189)  (0,066)  (0,052)  (0,029)  (0,058)  
Morocco 0,061 -0,039 -0,063 -0,239 -0,031 0,014 -0,045 0,045 -0,013 0,065 -0,012 0,015 
 (0,067)  (0,105) (0,077)  (0,215)  (0,020)  (0,046)  (0,056)  (0,177)  (0,076)  (0,073)  (0,027)  (0,089)  
Nigeria -0,078 -0,281 0,350** -0,223 -0,051 0,149*** -0,054 -0,043 -0,158 -0,188 -0,126* -0,248*** 
 (0,094)  (0,212) (0,121)  (0,369)  (0,047)  (0,049)  (0,118)  (0,293)  (0,127)  (0,254)  (0,075)  (0,075)  
Panama 0,151 0,107 0,144* 0,033 -0,047 -0,064 -0,042 0,533 0,030 -0,135 -0,033 0,109 
 (0,108)  (0,171) (0,073)  (0,230)  (0,051)  (0,122)  (0,174)  (0,389)  (0,118)  (0,110)  (0,039)  (0,093)  
Peru 0,075 0,367 0,224** 0,073 -0,114*** 0,064 -0,227 0,130 -0,051 -0,097 -0,019 0,223 
 (0,130)  (0,243) (0,096)  (0,463)  (0,044)  (0,101)  (0,167)  (0,419)  (0,112)  (0,373)  (0,052)  (0,210)  
Poland 0,078 0,052 0,151** 0,000 0,002 0,004 -0,083 0,315 -0,077 -0,128 -0,018 -0,037 
 (0,104)  (0,081) (0,075)  (0,086)  (0,019)  (0,056)  (0,082)  (0,197)  (0,067)  (0,101)  (0,026)  (0,044)  
Russia -0,498** -4,155*** 0,612** -1,531 0,011 2,420*** 0,197 -3,244** -0,152 -1,450* -0,116 -0,838 
 (0,229)  (0,652) (0,311)  (1,565)  (0,125)  (0,650)  (0,245)  (1,486)  (0,255)  (0,752)  (0,159)  (0,531)  
Venezuela 0,035 -0,160 0,194 -1,051*** -0,032 -0,146 -0,116 -1,787*** -0,054 0,759*** -0,034 0,541*** 
  (0,103)   (0,630)  (0,148)   (0,244)   (0,044)   (0,434)   (0,077)   (0,342)   (0,101)   (0,244)   (0,059)   (0,100)   
 
 
 
GMM estimates of:  
 
 
where 
 
(***), (**), (*) indicates coefficient significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively  
S.E. in parenthesis  
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Table 5 
Granger Causality Tests: Three factor Model with Ratings 
Estimates (cont.) 
                     
Countries Panama Peru Poland Russia Venezuela 
i\j gij    gij + zij + xij    gij    gij + zij + xij    gij    gij + zij + xij    gij    gij + zij + xij    gij    gij + zij + xij    
Argentina -0,064 0,176 -0,071** 0,096 -0,099 0,405*** -0,011 -0,063 -0,024 -0,051 
 (0,050)  (0,293)  (0,033)  (0,133)  (0,077) (0,147)  (0,011)  (0,050)  (0,039)  (0,260)  
Brazil 0,058* 0,280*** 0,021 0,177*** 0,007 0,364 0,038 0,017 0,062 -0,068 
 (0,034)  (0,077)  (0,032)  (0,028)  (0,044)  (0,246)  (0,030)  (0,030)  (0,073)  (0,064)  
Ecuador  -0,213* -0,044 -0,033 -0,101 -0,157 -0,672 -0,017 0,114 0,054 0,067 
 (0,111)  (0,362)  (0,112)  (0,169)  (0,152)  (0,811)  (0,045)  (0,081)  (0,137)  (0,146)  
Mexico 0,008 -0,050 -0,001 0,075 0,091 -0,021 -0,008 -0,020 0,007 -0,149 
 (0,039)  (0,106)  (0,030)  (0,052)  (0,099)  (0,162)  (0,018)  (0,021)  (0,034)  (0,034)  
Morocco -0,016 0,418* -0,039 0,097 0,057 0,584* 0,022 0,000 -0,016 0,081 
 (0,044)  (0,250)  (0,035)  (0,081)  (0,066)  (0,328)  (0,018)  (0,022)  (0,036)  (0,067)  
Nigeria -0,044 -0,292 0,063 0,042 0,000 -0,655* -0,009 0,000 -0,110 0,175* 
 (0,071)  (0,247)  (0,057)  (0,087)  (0,072)  (0,379)  (0,030)  (0,064)  (0,080)  (0,104)  
Panama 0,082 0,124 -0,094 -0,021 -0,200 0,314 -0,028 -0,023 0,012 -0,155 
 (0,057)  (0,182)  (0,087)  (0,120)  (0,149)  (0,311)  (0,026)  (0,027)  (0,071)  (0,114)  
Peru 0,007 -0,335 -0,119 -0,354*** -0,149 -0,039 -0,010 -0,033 -0,030 0,031 
 (0,066)  (0,218)  (0,074)  (0,121)  (0,133)  (0,620)  (0,030)  (0,040)  (0,084)  (0,165)  
Poland 0,021 -0,018 0,038 0,025 0,085 0,049 -0,027 -0,002 -0,104* -0,106** 
 (0,041)  (0,091)  (0,039)  (0,045)  (0,055)  (0,141)  (0,025)  (0,013)  (0,056)  (0,040)  
Russia -0,044 -2,395*** 0,122 -0,160 0,184 -5,434*** -0,005 0,580*** -0,243 0,645 
 (0,134)  (0,902)  (0,126)  (0,422)  (0,132)  (1,636)  (0,084)  (0,081)  (0,256)  (1,014)  
Venezuela 0,001 -0,105 -0,010 -0,374** -0,077 -0,513 0,003 0,002 -0,022 0,658*** 
  (0,060)   (0,327)   (0,044)   (0,164)   (0,085)   (0,752)   (0,034)   (0,081)   (0,076)   (0,097)   
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Table 6 
Granger Causality Tests: Three factor Model with Ratings 
 Wald Tests 
                       
Countries Argentina   Brazil   Ecuador    Mexico   Morocco   Nigeria   Panama   Peru   Poland   Russia   Venezuela   
i\j                                             
Argentina 11,570 *** 3,140 0,380 0,110 16,821*** 1,213 2,044 10,909*** 9,675*** 6,957** 0,402 
 (0,003)  (0,208) (0,827)  (0,946) (0,000) (0,545) (0,360)  (0,004) (0,008) (0,031) (0,818)  
Brazil 4,107 6,157** 0,731 1,995 0,459 2,797 4,068 0,468 2,201 9,569*** 1,957 
 (0,128)   (0,046) (0,694)   (0,369)  (0,795) (0,247)  (0,131)   (0,791)  (0,333)  (0,008)  (0,376)   
Ecuador 6,632 ** 11,272*** 3,100 2,630 6,063** 1,674 7,471 ** 0,885 1,948 5,305 0,250 
 (0,036)  (0,004) (0,212)  (0,268) (0,048) (0,433) (0,024)  (0,642) (0,378) (0,070) (0,882)  
Mexico 10,031 *** 9,139** 2,129 0,931 0,998 1,116 0,283 2,094 0,899 1,085 19,923 *** 
 (0,007)  (0,010) (0,345)  (0,628) (0,607) (0,572) (0,868)  (0,351) (0,638) (0,581) (0,000)  
Morocco 1,326 1,513 2,578 0,698 0,843 0,221 2,997 2,858 4,071 1,487 1,546 
 (0,515)  (0,469) (0,276)  (0,705) (0,656) (0,895) (0,223)  (0,240) (0,131) (0,475) (0,462)  
Nigeria 2,914 8,304** 10,928 *** 0,275 2,025 12,701*** 1,715 1,422 3,010 0,996 4,232 
 (0,233)   (0,016) (0,004)   (0,872)  (0,363) (0,002)  (0,424)   (0,491)  (0,222)  (0,951)  (0,121)   
Panama 2,231 3,875 1,094 1,937 1,593 2,310 2,595 1,228 2,934 1,839 1,861 
 (0,328)  (0,144) (0,579)  (0,380) (0,451) (0,315) (0,273)  (0,541) (0,231) (0,399) (0,394)  
Peru 3,134 5,470* 7,046 ** 2,073 0,280 1,203 2,395 12,361*** 1,259 0,759 0,152 
 (0,209)   (0,065) (0,030)   (0,355)  (0,869) (0,548)  (0,302)   (0,002)  (0,533)  (0,684)  (0,927)   
Poland 0,701 4,033 0,250 3,252 2,702 1,094 0,296 1,045 2,672 1,289 8,957 ** 
 (0,704)  (0,133) (0,988)  (0,197) (0,259) (0,579) (0,862)  (0,593) (0,263) (0,525) (0,011)  
Russia 4,771 * 5,128* 2,280 1,682 3,148 3,915 2,820 11,867*** 6,754** 0,749 4,267 
 (0,092)   (0,077) (0,320)   (0,431)  (0,207) (0,141)  (0,244)   (0,003)  (0,034)  (0,688)  (0,118)   
Venezuela 0,706  1,744 0,850  9,403*** 1,879 2,938 0,687  0,055 0,837 0,669 0,227  
  (0,703)    (0,418)  (0,654)    (0,009)   (0,391)  (0,230)   (0,709)    (0,973)   (0,658)   (0,716)   (0,893)    
 
 
 
Wald Test of the joint hypothesis that:  
 
in estimated equation: 
 
where  
 
 
 
(***), (**), (*) indicates coefficient significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. p -value in parenthesis  
0, 0i j i jg x= =
1 1 1 1 1i t ij jt i j j t it i j j t it ijtv v v DownOwn v DownOtherg z x e- - - - -= + × + × +
R R R
kt kt ej et wj wt rj rtv r f f fb b b= - - -
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